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ARGUMENT
I,
A.

REPLY TO HOMER'S BRIEF

HOMER DID NOT PROVE HI8 RIGHT TO A PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENT OVER SANDY HILLS1 PROPERTY
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE

Homer assails Sandy Hills1 statement of facts, by claiming a
failure to marshal all facts which support the trial courtfs findings,1
then by purportedly setting forth the facts which "are material to and
support those findings." Homer brief at 3.

Homerfs listing of facts

and record citations reveal the paucity of evidence Homer mustered to
support his prescriptive easement claims.

As will be demonstrated,

using Homer's record citations, many of his fact statements are wildly
inaccurate:
1.

Homer's

fact

statement

9

is absolutely

false

with

the

exception of the customers1 and Mr. Dewey's use of Sandy Hills'
property.
On direct examination by Mr. Verhaaren. Reed Smith testified:
Q. . . . I said after that curb cut was installed [directly east of
the Sandy Hills building], that was the point through which
customers for your store would gain access from 2100 East.
A.

Yes.
. . .

Q. Customers for the Dewev building, did they also have or gain
access, or did they gain access through that same point?
A.

Well, I think customers drove both ways, yes.

Q.

Okay.

A. Drive in from the south and drive to the front. Drive from the
north and they would drive—and they would exit one or the other.
Q. And your customers, I assume, when they would park in front of
your building when they exited, I assume, that at least some of
them would drive out toward the south past the Homer building?

Homer's failure to marshal the facts argument will be responded to below.

A. Well, as I recall, the parking in front of the building was
just straight. People would go straight in, and also parked in a
herringbone along the front, the way it is.

Q. So, after that [the installation of the curb and gutter], how
did your customers exit from your building?
A. They pulled in front of the building, back either way, and
would drive out the driveway.

Q. Out this way?
A. No.

Front driveway.

Q. This way?
A. Yes.
Q. Exit and entrance?
A. Yes.

Q. After those buildings were built, the Dewey building and the
Jones building.
How have customers for those buildings gained access to the
parking in front of those buildings?
A. I think they came from both ways.
north—
Q.

Both ways being—excuse me.

They would come from the

Go ahead.

A. They would come from the north and they would come in from the
south.
Record at 936-42 (emphasis added)•
Frederick Homer testified:
Q. Okay. When you were employed by Bonneville [Drug, in 1964],
were you there on the premises on a daily basis?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
And did you have an opportunity to see how customers of
Bonneville Drug gained access to the parking area east of the Homer
building?
A.

You bet.

Q.

How did they do that?

A.

They came in the curb cut and—

Q. Why don't you step down here and make a mark on Exhibit 35-P,
if you would, please. It's a little bit low. Can you see okay?
This is the Sandy Hills building right here.

Q.

Have you got that marked now correctly?

A.

Yes.

They would usually go out this way.

Q. Now, Mr. Homer, maybe we should mark—why don't we have you
mark the curb cuts where you start with that line, and mark that as
A, Point A, describing what's below.
A.

Okay.

Q. And then where you got the exit, use a point— or the other end
of the line, Point B.
A.

Okay.

Q. Mr. Homer, while you were there on the premises, did you have
the opportunity to observe customers of other businesses and how
they gained access and where they parked, both in the front and the
rear of the building?
A.

You bet?

Q.

How was that done?

A. Well, they had, because of—primarily because of the striping
and the configuration, especially in the front, they came in that—
or a curb cut, and came in and parked either in front of Sandy
Hills, if they were Sandy Hills' customers, or in front of my drug
store, if they were my customers.
Record at 1233-1237 (emphasis added).
Russell Grimshaw. the barber shop tenant of the northernmost
subdivision of the Homer building, testified:
Q. And would you indicate how customers would reach your property
from 2100 East as far as gaining access is concerned [at] anytime
from the time you first occupied the property?
A. As I say, nothing has changed. And they come in front of
Smith's property and go down and park in front of the businesses
and then back and then down through the drive-through.

Q. Where have you observed, then, your customers gaining access to
the front parking area?
A.

They come in through entrance A.

Q.

And when they exit, where do they usually go?

A.

B.

Record at 1337-38 (emphasis added).
Barbara Smith testified:
Q. Mrs. Smith,
East Street and
is it true that
the Sandy Hills
A.

Oh, yes.

after the curb and gutter was installed along 21st
there were curb cuts placed at various intervals,
Mr. Dewey. from time to time, crossed in front of
Building in order to gain access to his property?

That's true.

Record at 1637a-38 (emphasis added).
In the foregoing record citations there is no evidence of Homer's
use of the Sandv Hills property nor of Dewey's or Homer's tenants1,
agents', business invitees', employees' or vendors' use of the Sandy
Hills property.
2.

Homer's fact statement 10 is irrelevant because the Smith's

use of its property and of neighboring property was not an issue at
trial and is not an issue on appeal.

The fact statement, however, is

lacking in its record support.
Homer's record citations are devoid of evidence of anyone's use,
except customers of Sandy Hills.

Homer's citation to pages 937-41 of

the record is Reed Smith's testimony, reproduced

in all material

respects as it relates to ingress and egress above, regarding fact
statement 9.
Russell Grimshaw testified:
Q. Have you observed customers of Sandy Hills or its predecessors
gain access to the premises?
A.

Yes.

Q.
Have your customers parked down in front of Sandy Hills
building?

A.

Yes, they have over the years•

Q.
And have Sandy Hills customers parked
building?
A.

in front of your

Yes.

Q. Have you watched the Sandy Hills customers gain access and —
I111 say ingress and egress—get access to the parking in front of
this building?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, where that—where they gain access and at what point?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And when they exit, which way they go?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do they always do it that way?

A.

Not always, no.

Q.

When they don't do it that way, how do they do it?

A. If they decide to go back the way they came in, they back out
and go out. And they don't always just drive through, but that's
the general flow of the traffic through there.
Record at 1338-1339 (emphasis added).
3.

The first sentence of Homer's fact statement 11 is accurate,

but the second sentence is inaccurate.
Reed Smith testified that fill dirt was brought in on Lots 1, 2, 3
and 4 to raise the level of the property to store level and to provide
a parking lot and access from 1300 South.

Record at 902-03.

Barbara Smith testified that dirt was hauled in to make the parking
lot in the rear.

Record at 1643.

Darrell Scheller, the former proprietor of the Jones Building
depicted on Exhibit 87-D, testified that the rear of the properties was
filled in and hard surfaced, and that after that, he and others gained
access from 1300 South, across the back, and out the alley to 2100
East.

Record at 1323-24.

4,

Homer's

fact statement

13 is completely

false with the

exception of access by customers of the various business and Scheller's
basement tenant[s].
Reed Smith testified:
Q. . . . The point I want to make was that after that time,
customers for your store, customers for the Homer store, and
customers for Callister fnow Steur] property, Sprouse Reitz. had
access off 1300 South along the back over this 50-foot right-of-way
and off 2100 East through the right-of-way, directly east of the
Sprouse Reitz Building?
A.

Yes.

Q. And that continued that way for a number of years until this
concrete barrier went in place; isn't that true?

A. Now the question you asked me, there was freedom of traffic in
and out across that—until that point in time?
Q.

Correct.

A.

Yes, that is correct.

Record at 947-48 (emphasis added).
Frederick Homer testified;
Q. . . . And would you indicate—and this time start with letter C,
perhaps—where access was gained from 13th South to park to the
rear of the Homer building, and then where the exits from that
parking would be.
A.

All right.

Q.

Okay.

Starts here.

A. Is that all right?
here at B.

And go through here and usually come out

Q.

At Point B.

A.

Right.

Q.

How was access gained to the rear from 2100 East, then?

A. Come in at Point B and go back here and park in here. And if
there was—depending on where they were going, they would need to
go out to Point C or turn around and come out Point B.
Q. . . . Was that the pattern that was followed during the time
that you were there at the premises starting in 1964?

A.

You bet.

Record at 1334-35 (emphasis added).
Darrell Scheller testified:
Q. . . Describe how customers would gain access to and from the
rear parking area to 13th South.
A. Across the property from 13th South, across the Sandy Hills
property, across the Homer property, and the tenants had a parking
soot there for their unit in the basement, where thev could come
from 21st East, either way.
Record at 1326 (emphasis added).
5.

Homerfs fact statement 14 is equally devoid of evidentiary

support and is irrelevant.

Sandy Hills' and its predecessors1 use of

the various properties was not an issue at trial and is not an issue on
appeal•
The record citations for fact statement 14 are the same as set
forth above for fact statement 13. Again, the evidence shows use only
by various customers of the businesses, Homer's vague "access was
gained" reference and Scheller's reference to his basement tenant[s].
Furthermore, Reed Smith and Darrell Scheller testified that customers
gained access from 1300 South and across the rear.

Homer apparently

showed on the exhibit how "access was gained" to the rear from 1300
South and from 2100 East.
6.

Homer's fact statement 15 is accurate with the following

exceptions:

(1) The 1953 Agreement was signed only by Reed Smith,

Thomas Dewey and Vera Callister (exhibit S-6); (2) The Agreement and
deeds of right-of-way (exhibits S-10 and S-11) called for reciprocal
easements between the Deweys and Smiths on the one hand and Mrs.
Callister on the other. The Dewevs and Smiths did not grant each other
reciprocal rights-of-way.
7.

Homer's fact statement 21 is accurate but incomplete.

Reed

Smith is the president and secretary of Smith Investment Company,

record at 1633, and there are no non-family members who are officers,
directors or shareholders of Smith Investment Company.
Smith is the "vice president".
8.

Id.

Barbara

Record at 798-99.

Regarding Homer's fact statement 22, while it is true that

Reed Smith considered Steurs to be in violation of the 1953 Agreement,
Homer's record citation does not support the assertion that Reed Smith
sought support from Homer to terminate the agreement.

Homer testified

at pages 1243 and 1244 of the record that Mr. Smith said he was
concerned about the impact of Mr. Steur's parking and inquired whether
Homer considered Mr. Steur to be in breach of the parking areas in the
back. Homer responded, "Well, I can't tell what is Mr. Steur's parking
and what is customer parking.
all the time."2

I don't stand out here and monitor it

Homer said that Mr. Smith said, "Well, we've got to

do something about this," and that when Homer responded that Steur had
18 parking stalls on the rear parking areas, Mr. Smith became angry.
Record at 1243-44.
9.

Homer's fact statement 23 is inaccurate, completely irrelevant

to any issue below or on appeal and presents evidence as to which an
objection was sustained.
10.
Reed

Record at 1244.

While Homer's fact statement 24 is not completely inaccurate.

Smith testified, however, that his purpose

in erecting the

concrete and chain link fence was to prevent access from 2100 East
through the rear 50-foot right-of-way to the two lots
Gardens, Lots 1 and 2) north of the barrier.

(Lichfield

Record at 879.

11.

Homer's fact statement 26 is irrelevant to any issue on

appeal.

The trial court determined that "Homer is entitled to no

2

This also is probably a more honest answer to the question whether he observed
how access was gained to the front and rear of his property. He probably did not
"stand out here and monitor it all the time" any more than he monitored parking.

damages by reason of any alleged trespass of Sandy Hills or its agents
on the Homer Building."
12.

Record at 642, 661 (Conclusion of Law 14).

Homer's fact statement 27 is unsupported by the evidence.

Homer testified on cross-examination that Mr. Smith did not object to
Homer's customers' and tenants' ingress and egress across the front and
rear of the Sandy Hills property, nor did he grant permission to use
that property.

Record at 1309-10.

There is no testimony identified

that would support (explicitly or implicitly) that Homer's and his
Predecessors' use of the front and rear of the Sandy Hills property was
"visible to and known by the Smiths and their successors-in-interest,
and continued uninterrupted."
13.

Homer's fact statement 28 is also unsupported by the evidence.

At pages 1238 and 1239 of the record, Homer related a conversation
he had with Reed Smith regarding patron parking.

Mr. Homer said that

nothing was discussed with regarding access to the properties. At page
1242, Homer related another conversation with Reed Smith in which Reed
Smith told Homer that Homer did not need cones to protect the new
asphalt on the parking lot. Nothing was discussed regarding access to
the property.

At page 1295, Mr. Homer stated that he had no written

agreement giving him access to cross the front or rear of the Sandy
Hills property.

As set forth above, at pages 1309-1310, Homer stated

that Mr. Smith had neither objected to nor granted permission for
Homer's customers or tenants to cross the front and rear of the Sandy
Hills property.
Finally, at pages 1689-92 of the record, on cross-examination Mr.
Smith testified that although he permitted the Deweys and their patrons

t o c r o s s t h e p r o p e r t y , he did not permit Homer t o c r o s s t h e p r o p e r t y . 3
Mr.

Smith a l s o t e s t i f i e d

t h a t he deeded Dewey's property

t o him

r e l u c t a n t l y but t h a t he had a good r e l a t i o n s h i p with Mr. Dewey.

Record

Mr. Verhaaren f s attempt t o impeach Mr. Smith on t h a t p o i n t

a t 1689-91.

was s t r i c k e n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t .

Id. a t 1696.

B.

SANDY HILLS MARSHALLED ALL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
THAT HOMER HAD ACQUIRED PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS
OVER SANDY HILLS 1 PROPERTY

In 23 s e p a r a t e l y numbered and single-spaced paragraphs spread over
four pages of i t s main b r i e f in section A . l , Sandy H i l l s marshalled not
only evidence supporting the t r i a l c o u r t 1 s findings and conclusions
t h a t Homer had acquired a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement over Sandy H i l l s 1
p r o p e r t y , but a l l evidence adduced by any p a r t y concerning t h e claimed
p r e s c r i p t i v e easements.

See pages 16-19 of Appellants 1 main b r i e f .

The following findings and conclusions of t h e t r i a l c o u r t cannot
stand:

Findings

of

Fact

23 and 24 4 regarding

Homer f s

Predecessors 1 and Sandy H i l l s 1 and t h e i r P r e d e c e s s o r s '

and

his

use of

the

property e a s t of t h e Sandy H i l l s b u i l d i n g ; Findings of Fact 26 and 27
regarding Homer's and h i s Predecessors 1 use of t h e property e a s t of t h e
Sandy H i l l s b u i l d i n g and t h e character of t h e u s e ; Findings of Fact 34,
35, 36 and 37 regarding Homer's and h i s Predecessors' and Sandy H i l l s '
and t h e i r P r e d e c e s s o r s ' use of the property west of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e
b u i l d i n g s and t h e c h a r a c t e r of Homer's and h i s P r e d e c e s s o r s '

3

use;

This testimony was e l i c i t e d by reading Sandy H i l l s ' Interrogatory Answers. The
s t r u c t u r e of t h e answers c l e a r l y implied t h a t i t was a f t e r Mr. Homer (through
B o n n e v i l l e Drug) bought t h e property t h a t Sandy H i l l s did not extend permission t o
Mr. Homer.
See Defendants* Answer t o Interrogatory No. 3 , a copy of which i s
reproduced as Exhibit A i n the addendum.
In a d d i t i o n , t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e
Interrogatory answer read by Mr. Smith, record at 1690, s t a t e d t h a t Mr. Smith did not
g i v e permission t o Homer or h i s l e s s e e s t o cross the property. Homer had l e s s e e s only
a f t e r he owned t h e property. F i n a l l y , Mr. Smith t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e permission he gave
t o Dewey t o c r o s s t h e property was extended t o Mr. Dewey's l e s s e e s , i n c l u d i n g
B o n n e v i l l e Drug, during t h e time i t was a l e s s e e of Mr. Dewey. Record at 1661.
* Record a t 642.

Findings of Fact 39, 40 and 41 regarding Smiths' testimony that they
granted

permission

to

Deweys

to

use

their

property,

the

characterization of testimony as unworthy of belief, the rejection of
that testimony, and the rejection that Smith Investment Company and
Sandy Hills gave permission to Deweys or their successors; Finding of
Fact 44 regarding Bonneville Drug's and Russell Grimshaw's expectations
under their leases; Finding of Fact 46 concerning the use by Homer and
his Predecessors of the property east and west of Sandy Hills' property
and the nature of that use not in subordination to Sandy Hills.

The

Conclusions of Law which correspond to these Findings of Fact are also
unsupported.

See Record at 642.

The fatal flaw in these Findings of Fact (and in the corresponding
Conclusions of Law) is that the evidence does not support them.
Consistently throughout the trial, evidence was adduced as to various
customers' use of the parties' properties for ingress, egress and
parking.

Very little evidence was presented concerning any other

person's use of Sandy Hills' property on the front (east) or rear
(west) for ingress and egress to and from the various businesses.
Importantly, even less evidence was presented concerning Homer's use of
the property or the use of his privies (Deweys, Bonneville Drug,
Grimshaw,

Homer's

agents, employees

or

suppliers).

Other

than

customers of the various businesses, whose use of Sandy Hills' property
for ingress and egress was necessarily permissive, being invitees of
the businesses, and whose use would not inure to the benefit of Homer
in any event because their use was not in privity with Homer, the
following is all of the evidence adduced concerning any other person's
use of Sandy Hills' property5:

* This list is taken directly from the list of evidence marshalled by Sandy Hills
in its main brief at pages 16-19.

1. Reed Smith testified that before Sandy Hills placed a barrier
along its boundary line in the front of its store in 1989, a person
could gain access to the front of the Sandy Hills property from the
curb cut on 2100 East and then drive to the south and exit through
the other curb cut. Record at 949-50.
2. Frederick Homer testified that access was gained from 1300
South to park to the rear of the Homer building and usually the
exit would be at Point B [the curb cut south of the Homer building
and east of the Steur building at the opening of the 26-foot rightof-way north of the Steur building]. Access to the rear from 2100
East Street was gained at Point B. Depending on where they were
going, they would need to go out at Point C [the 1300 South curb
cut] or turn around and come out Point B. Record at 1235.
3. Mr. Homer testified that he believed there was public access
from Points B [across the Steur property] and C [across Sandy
Hills1 property]. Record at 1276-77.
4. Darrell Scheller [the former proprietor of the Jones building]
testified that after the rear parking area was hard-surfaced, he
and others gained access to the back of the property from 1300
South [across Sandy Hills1 property] and then down the 26-foot
right-of-way to 2100 East. Record at 1324.
5. Darrell Scheller testified that "the tenants had a parking spot
there for their unit in the basement, where they could come from
2100 East, either way [indicating the Jones building location].
Record at 1326.
6. Darrell Scheller testified that he had a verbal agreement with
Mr. Dewey because of the elimination of his right-of-way. Mr.
Dewey guaranteed him access to 1300 South [across Sandy Hills1
property] and to 2100 East, and his customers used that for many
years. Record at 1330.
7. Darrell Scheller testified that they (being Mr. Smith and Mr.
Dewey) granted Mr. Scheller a right-of-way across Lots 1, 2 [Sandy
Hills1 property], 3 and 4 when they cut off his right-of-way to
Yuma Street. Record at 1332.
8. Mr. Scheller testified that when a thousand people or more
would go through there [across the Sandy Hills property from 1300
South], public access may be available to a lot of people. Record
at 1333-34.
9. Barbara Smith testified that after the curb and gutter were
installed along 2100 East Street, Mr. Dewey crossed in front of the
Sandy Hills building in order to gain access to his property. She
testified that Mr. and Mrs. Smith permitted the Deweys to access
the Smiths1 property and the Deweys permitted the Smiths to cross
the Deweys1 property. Record at 1637a-39.
10. Barbara Smith testified that in order for the Deweys or their
customers or lessees to travel from the 26-foot right-of-way
through Lots 3 and 4 to 1300 South Street they had to cross Lots 1
and 2. Mrs. Smith testified that she did not object to the Dewevsf

crossing Lots 1 and 2 because they were her parents. The Smiths
and the Deweys did not enter into a written agreement with respect
to crossing each others' property because she would have been
embarrassed to ask for one. Mr. and Mrs. Smith consented to the
Deweys' crossing Lots 1 and 2 in the rear and to the Dewevs'
crossing in front of the Sandy Hills building. The Smiths also
consented to the Dewevs' lessees and customers crossing Lots 1 and
2 and in front of the Sandy Hills building. Record at 1648-53.
11. Reed Smith testified that the Smiths permitted the Dewevs to
cross their property and the Deweys permitted the Smiths to cross
the Dewey property. Record at 1657.
12. Reed Smith testified that the arrangement with the Deweys with
respect to crossing each others' property extended to the Deweys on
the one hand, the Smiths on the other, and their respective
building lessees and the business patrons. This permission was
extended from the Smiths to Bonneville Drug during the period of
time that Bonneville Drug was a lessee of Mr. Dewey. Record at
1660-61.
There is simply no evidence in the foregoing of Homer's use of the
property.

The only evidence with respect to the use of his privies is

the Deweys' use of the property and the testimony was that that use was
permissive in nature.
Not only is there grossly insufficient evidence of use of Sandy
Hills' property by Homer and his privies, there is no evidence
concerning the nature of that use (open, notorious, adverse) and little
evidence

as to the timing

of that use

(continuous

and without

interruption) . There is some evidence when various uses began, or when
certain individuals first observed use, but that testimony of Mr.
Smith, Mr. Homer, Mr. Grimshaw and Mr. Scheller was primarily of
customers' use of the property.6
Accordingly, the findings are against the clear weight of the
evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous and must be overturned.

In addition, Mr. Smith testified as to how "a person" could gain access; Mr.
Homer testified how "access was gained" by unidentified persons; Mr. Scheller
testified how "he and others" gained access.

C.

HOMER MUST ESTABLISH HIS RIGHT TO PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS
THROUGH HIS OR HIS PREDECESSOR'S USE OF THE PROPERTY.

Astoundingly,

Homer

criticizes

the

Utah

Supreme

Court's

pronouncements that a person claiming a prescriptive easement must show
that he acquired it by his own use independent of the use of others.
Nielson v. Sandbercr. 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696, 700 (1943).

See also

Richard v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J.,
dissenting) (evidence of use made by anyone other than plaintiff and
his predecessors in interest is irrelevant; alleged use by others, not
in plaintifffs chain of title, does not provide evidentiary basis to
establish plaintiff's use under a claim of right) (quoting Nielson v.
Sandbera, 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696 (1943)).
In Chournos v. Alkema. 27 Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 950 (1972), the
Supreme Court upheld an easement by implication, but reversed the
court's finding that a prescriptive easement had been established:
The trial court erred in so far as it found a prescriptive
right in defendants based upon public use. A prescriptive
right was originally based upon the theory of a grant implied
from long user, and it runs to the individual and not to the
public. One cannot claim a right of way as a private
one by
showing that it has been used by the public; he must show user
by himself or his predecessors of the way to his own lot.
While a public road may be so established, the
use by individual persons in common with the public
generally is regarded as permissive, and by such
common use no individual person can acquire a right
by prescription as against the owner of the fee . .
•

494 P.2d at 953 (quoting Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Morgan Bros.
Land and Livestock Co. , 81 Utah 317, 17 P.2d 826, 827 (1932) (emphasis
added))•
Homer's reliance on customers' use of the Sandy Hills property in
order to establish a prescriptive easement in himself is the same as
relying on public use.

Customers of the various businesses are the

general public and such use is considered to be permissive.

Court after court has held that one claiming a prescriptive
easement must establish his own use and cannot rely on a like right in
others.

See Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d

296, 304

(Alaska 1985)

(claimant's use must be notorious in its own right and not dependent on
a similar right in others; if claimant's use is in common with the
public's use, "the claimant must perform some act with the owner's
knowledge clearly indicating his own individual claim of right.");
Anderson v. Felten. 612 P.2d 216 (Nev. 1980) (no evidence that claimant
ever used road after his purchase of the property; therefore, if an
easement by prescription were created, it must have been by claimant's
predecessor whose use was infrequent and sporadic.

One may acquire a

prescriptive easement which is also used by the public, but the private
right must rest on actual use by the claimant and his predecessors and
not on their use as members of general public); Luoma v. Donohoe, 588
P.2d 523 (Mont. 1979) (an exclusive use means that the claimant's right
to use the right-of-way is independent of a like right-of-way in
another); Garmond v. Kinnev. 91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178 (1978) (a
finding that the general public used the roadway is inconsistent with
the conclusion that plaintiffs established a prescriptive easement; an
easement by prescription could not be acquired by usage common with or
similar to that of the general public); Medina v. Brown, 342 P.2d 353
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (what is meant when exclusiveness is used in
reference to an easement is that the right shall not depend for its
enjoyment on a similar right in others; it must be exclusive as against
the community and public at large);

Simmons v. Perkinsr 118 P.2d 740

(Idaho 1941) (the use of a driveway in common with the owner and the
general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part
indicating a separate and exclusive use on this part, negatives any
presumption of individual right therein in his favor; an individual

using land as a road in common with the public cannot acquire a
prescriptive right of way against the owner) (citing Thornley Land &
Livestock Co. v. Morgan Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 81 Utah 317, 17
P.2d 826 (1932)).
In Read v. Pokey. 92 Or. App. 298, 758 P.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1988),
the Court stated:
Plaintiff has shown that he continuously used the road for
more than [the prescriptive period]. However, the other facts
preponderate against him. He did not construct the road but
merely assisted in its maintenance. He used it as an existing
way and, apparently, did not interfere with defendants1 use of
their property until shortly before he brought his action.
Also, his use has been non-exclusive in character.
He
introduced evidence that the road was used by others for a
variety of purposes. The significance of that is discussed in
Thompson v. Scott,
supra, 270 Or. at 551, 528 P.2d 509, quoting
3 Powell on Real Property,
f 413, p. 483 (1973):
"fIf the claimant is only one of two, or
several, or many, who make the use in question, it
is perhaps inferrable [sic] that all of these uses
are permissive. In such a case the claimant must
affirmatively prove the adverse character of this
behavior. Ilf
758 P.2d at 400.
Homer has not proved his use of Sandy Hills1 property, much less
affirmatively proved the adverse character of it.

Homer's testimony

was vague and confusing as were the questions put to him. For example,
he was asked how "access was gained" to the rear property without
identification of by whom access was gained.

The Court in Thompson v.

Scott. 270 Or. 542, 528 P.2d 509 (1974), noted that the claimant's
testimony of his use of the claimed easement was vague and ambiguous.
This same kind of ambiguity pervades the entire record, leaving
it unclear whether there was a use of any kind, adverse or
otherwise, for a continuous period of ten years. We have
frequently said that prescription or adverse possession cannot
be established by vague and general testimony purporting to
describe the claimants1 use.
528 P.2d at 511.

After attacking Sandy Hills1 contention that Homer can rely only on
his use and that of his predecessors, Homer cites several cases for the
proposition that one claiming a prescriptive easement may rely on the
use of others "who are in privity with or in subordination to the
claimant." Homer brief at 14. While Sandy Hills is not sure that that
statement is different in kind from the general rule that one claiming
a prescriptive right must show use by himself or his predecessors, an
examination of Homerfs cases reveals that the use by "others" generally
constituted use by the claimant.

For example, in Crane v. Crane, 683

P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984), the association members hired riders to herd
sheep over the easement. The riders were therefore agents or employees
of the association members and their use would be considered the
claimants1 use.

In Ellison v. Fellows. 437 A.2d 278 (N.H. 1981), the

claimants and their agents used the roadway for various purposes. The
Court stated that although the claimants did not always use the
easement personally, use by their agents was sufficient to establish
prescriptive rights in claimants. Again, the use of the agent of the
claimants was considered the use of the claimant.
Citv of Ashland v. Hardestv, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) ,
involved

the

City

of Ashlandfs,

claim

that

it

had

acquired

a

prescriptive easement by its employees1 use of the way as often as
needed.

Here, again, the employee's use was the claimant's use.

A

municipality cannot easily act without the human acts or attributes of
its employees.

Homer also cites many cases in which tenants1 use

contributed to establishing the prescriptive easement.

In Feldman v.

Knapp. 250 P.2d 92 (Or. 1952), Te Selle v. Storey, 319 P.2d 218 (Mont.
1957); Jacobs v. Brewster, 190 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1935); and Andrzeiczyk
v. ADVO System. Inc., 151 A.2d 881 (Conn. 1959), there was evidence of
ample adverse use by the owners of the dominant estate which was

participated

in by their tenants.

Under the rule announced

in

Dereaibus v. Silberman Furniture Co., 186 A. 553 (Conn. 1936), after
retrial f 197 A. 760 (Conn. 1938), use of the servient estate by a
tenant can inure to the benefit of the landlord only if the use of the
servient estate is expressed or implied under the lease.
Despite Homer's contention that he can rely on the use of others to
establish a prescriptive right in himself to cross Sandy Hills1
property, the rule in Utah and most other jurisdictions remains that
the person claiming the prescriptive right must show that he acquired
it by his own use, or that of his predecessors-in-interest, independent
of a similar right in others.

In addition, Homerfs evidence showing

use of Sandy Hills1 property by the general public indicates that all
use of Sandy Hills1 property was permissive. While Homer can establish
a prescriptive right to use property that is also used by the public,
he must show some decisive act on his part indicating a separate and
exclusive use.

Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 950

(1972); Simmons v. Perkins. 118 P.2d 740 (Idaho 1941).
Homer presents a summary in his brief attempting to show use of
Sandy Hills1 property by "Homer and his Predecessors, individually."
Homer brief at 16-18. Homer testified, for example, that he was at the
Homer property daily from 1964 to 1985.

Id. at 16.

Nothing is said

concerning Homerfs access to the property, however, which is the
critical issue.

Homer has access to his property from the curb cut

located at the 26-foot right-of-way off 2100 East. He does not have to
cross Sandy Hills1 property to park in the front or the rear of his
property from that access.

Record at 1235, 1291-92.

In addition, Homer recites to testimony concerning his tenants1
parking in the rear of his building, Mr. Deweyfs parking in the rear of
the property, and Russell Grimshawfs parking at the rear property.

Record at 1304, 1239, 1346, 1350.

Again, no mention was made of how

these people gained access to the rear for parking.
Homer makes the point that access to the Homer rear parking from
1300 South can only be gained by crossing the Sandy Hills property.
That is true, but it is also true that access to Homerfs rear parking
can be gained from 2100 East without crossing Sandy Hills1 property.
Simply because access can be gained across Sandy Hills1 property, it
does not follow that Homer proved by clear and convincing evidence that
he or his predecessors in interest crossed Sandy Hills1 property
openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely for the prescriptive
period.
While Barbara Smith testified that the Deweys and their lessees,
customers and tenants crossed Sandy Hills' property in the front and
the rear to gain access to Homer's property, she also testified that
that use was permissive.

In any event, she did not testify how long

such use continued. The same is true of Mr. Smith's testimony that the
Deweys crossed Sandy Hills' property to gain access to their property.
Homer also makes the following statement:
Homer testified that he and his tenants used the Sandy Hills
property for ingress and egress and that the Smiths and Sandy
Hills did not object to that use.
Homer brief at 16-17.

The record citation for that statement is

apparently pages 1309-10 (see footnote 11 on page 17 of Homer's brief).
The statement is false regarding use.

On cross-examination at pages

1309-10 of the record Homer testified that neither the Smiths nor Sandy
Hills objected to Homers' or Homers' tenants' use of "this means of
ingress and egress," but no testimony was elicited as to whether Homer
and his tenants used "this means" of ingress and egress. See Record at
1309-10.

D. SANDY HILLS ESTABLISHED THAT DEWEYS1 USE
OF SANDY HILLS* PROPERTY WAS PERMISSIVE THROUGH
DIRECT TESTIMONY AND THROUGH PRESUMPTIONS OF PERMISSIVE USE
1.

The Smiths1 testimony was credible and consistent.

The Smiths testified that they extended permission to the Deweysf
Barbara Smiths parents, to traverse the Smith property, and that the
Deweys likewise extended permission to them to cross the Deweys1
property.

Record at 1639, 1650, 1652, 1657-58, 1661.

Homerfs

assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Smiths1 testimony is
consistent and thoroughly credible. Admittedly, the testimony is selfserving in the sense that it is favorable to the Smiths1 position, but
that does not make it necessarily unbelievable. In Guinand v. Walton,
25 Utah 2d 253, 480 P.2d 137 (1971), a case relied by Homer, the Court
acknowledged that a witness1 self interest may justify not believing
his testimony, "[b]ut it does not necessarily require doing so."
P.2d at 139.

480

In that case, the Court affirmed findings "based solely

on the self-serving testimony of the plaintiff," despite the existence
of other evidence.

Id.

Both Reed and Barbara Smith affirmed that they did not have a
written agreement with the Deweys concerning crossing each others1
property because the Deweys were Mrs. Smiths1 parents.

Mrs. Smith

testified:
Q. All Right. Is there a reason that you and Mr. Smith and the
Deweys did not enter into a written agreement of some kind with
respect to crossing each others1 property in the rear?
A. Well, I would have been embarrassed to ask them.
have asked them to sign something on that.

I wouldn't

Record at 1650.
Mr. Smith testified:
Q. Now, Mr. Smith, did there come a point in time when the Smiths,
on the one hand, and the Deweys, on the other hand, made any kind
of a written contract, or agreement, that is in writing as to their

customers being able to cross in front of their property—I'm
sorry—your property to get to their destination, and vice versa?
A.

No, there was not a written agreement.

Q.

Can you tell the court why?

A. Well, we didnft feel the need for a written agreement. Mr. and
Mrs. Dewey were by wifefs parents, my in-laws. We permitted the
Deweys to cross our property and they permitted us to cross theirs.
Record at 1657.
By contrast, the Smiths did have a written agreement with Mrs.
Callister regarding easements.

Exhibits S-6, S-10, S-ll.

The Smiths

and Deweys on the one hand granted Mrs. Callister the right to cross
Lichfield Gardens Lots 1 and 2 (belonging to the Smiths) and Lots 3 and
4 (belonging to the Deweys).

In exchange, Mrs. Callister allowed the

Smiths and Deweys to cross the northerly 26 and 1/2 feet of her
property.

Id.

Significantly, the Deweys and Smiths did not have a

written agreement between themselves concerning the Smiths1 crossing
Lots 3 and 4 and the Deweys' crossing Lots 1 and 2, although it was
obviously contemplated at least that the Smiths would cross Lots 3 and
4 to access the 26-foot right-of-way over Mrs. Canister's property.
Given the detail of the 1953 Agreement and the deeds of right-ofway, the lack of an agreement between the Smiths and the Deweys was not
an oversight.

The logical conclusion is that they did not need an

agreement between them since they permitted each to cross the others'
property.

It is not logical that the Smiths and Deweys intended to

prescribe in the others' property—if they intended a permanent rightof-way across each others' property, they easily could have included
such a provision in the 1953 Agreement and have prepared deeds of
right-of-way between them.
Homer hyper-technically scrutinizes the Smiths' testimony in an
attempt to discover internal discrepancies or weaknesses. For example,

he points out that Mrs. Smith stated there was no arrangement between
the Smiths and Deweys regarding crossing each others' property while
Mr. Smith said there was an arrangement.

Putting the testimony of the

Smiths back into context, here is what they said:
Mrs. Smith;
Q. Mrs. Smith, do you recall whether you and Mr. Smith and Mr. and
Mrs. Dewey had some kind of arrangement as to access by Mr. Dewey
to the Dewey property?

A. Yes, they used it freely. No, we didn't have any kind of an
arrangements of any kind. They just used it as we did, too.
Q. Did you and Mr. Smith permit the Deweys to have access through
property, across your property?
A.

Yes.

Record at 1638-39.
Mr. Smith;
Q. Can you tell the court why [there was not a written agreement
between the Smiths and the Deweys regarding crossing each others1
property]?
A. Well, we didn't feel the need for a written agreement. Mr. and
Mrs. Dewey were by wife's parents, my in-laws. We permitted the
Deweys to cross our property and they permitted us to cross theirs.
Q. Over what period of time did that—I'm going to call it an
arrangement. Mr. Smith, where you were permitted to cross the
Deweys' property and they were permitted to cross yours. How long
did this arrangement last, sir?
A. Oh, from the time that the west side parking was developed,
approximately 1954 until the time that Mrs. Dewey passed away—or
Mrs. Dewey sold her property, I should say.
Record at 1657-58 (emphasis added).
When considered in context the Smiths' testimony is consistent.
Counsel coined the term "arrangement" in questioning Mr. Smith, but
both witnesses testified that they did extend permission to the Deweys
to cross their property.

Homer also claims that the Smiths testified inconsistently on
whether the Smiths1 and Deweys1 rear parking areas were common. Again,
however, when the testimony is viewed in context, as it should be, the
testimony is completely consistent.
Mrs. Smith:
Q. Now, once the parking areas were complete on Lots one, two,
three and four, did you consider the parking area to be a common
parking area?
A. Yes. we considered it to be used by both of us.
they used it.

We used it;

Q.
I guess what I'm asking, Mrs. Smith, is whether once the
parking area was developed, did you consider the parking area to be
in common ownership with the Deweys?
A. No. Oh, no, not common ownership, no. We were very independent
and they were independent; and as far as taxes or anything else, we
didn't ever know that they paid. They didnft know what we paid.
They didn't know what we rented our duplexes for. S o —
Record at 1644-45.
Mr. Smith:
Q. Mr. Smith, was there ever an arrangement that you can tell us
about that you were a party to with respect to the joint sharing of
any parking?
A.

No, there was not.

Q.
So the arrangement, as you have described, was limited to
simply crossing the property without any parking; is that right?
A.

That is correct?

Record at 1660.
This testimony also is consistent.

Mrs. Smith testified that the

parking areas were not in common ownership and Mr. Smith testified that
there was not an arrangement for joint sharing of parking.

Any

arrangement the parties had was with respect crossing the properties.
Finally, Homer claims that Mr. Smith changed his story by saying on
direct examination that he did extend permission to Homer to cross the
property and on cross examination admitted that he did not.

A more

careful examination of the testimony reveals that the Smiths extended
permission to Homer to use the property while Homer was a tenant of the
Dewevs and that the permission lasted until Mrs. Dewey sold her
property:
Q. Now, let me ask you, Mr. Smith, whether or not the arrangement
to cross the respective parties1 properties between the Deweys, on
the one hand, and the Smiths, on the other, extended to tenants of
yours and Mrs. Deweys1?
A.

Yes. It was extended to the lessees of both of our properties.

Q.
And was the permission that you talked about, likewise,
extended to Mr. Homerfs company—I believe the name was Bonneville
Drug—while they were in the property?

A. It was during the period of time that Mr. Homer was a lessee of
Mr. Dewey.
Record at 1660-61.
Sandy Hills1 answer to interrogatory no. 3, in summarizing the
substance of the facts and opinions about which Mr. Smith was expected
to testify, stated as follows:
6. That after 21st East Street was improved with curb, gutter and
sidewalk, Mr. Smith permitted Mr. Dewey and his patrons to traverse
Mr. Smith1s property located adjacent to the Dewey property;
7. That in 1963, or thereabouts, Mr. Dewey began leasing the
drugstore building to Plaintiff Homer, and that in or about 1976,
Plaintiff Homer purchased the drugstore building including the
barbershop, pizza parlor and apartments, from Lorraine Dewey, Mr.
Dewey's widow;
8. That neither Mr. Smith nor his successor(s) in interest, gave
permission to Plaintiff Homer or his patrons, lessees or others
claiming by, through or under him, to traverse the property owned
by Mr. Smith or his successor(s) in the front or in the rear of the
Sandy Hills building.
At the end of the summary appeared the following admonition:
The foregoing is not intended to be detailed nor exhaustive,
but is only a summary of and the substance of Mr. Smith's
expected testimony.

A copy of Sandy H i l l s 1 answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s are included i n the
addendum h e r e t o .
The substance of t h e foregoing summary of Mr. Smith f s
testimony

and

its

(although

admittedly

juxtaposition
not

reveals

clearly

stated),

that
was

what
that

was

expected
intended

after

Homer

purchased t h e Dewey property, no permission was extended t o him.

The

permission extended by t h e Smiths went t o t h e Deweys and t h o s e who
claimed

under

permission

was

him.

When Mr.

extended

Smith was

by him t o

asked

Bonneville

at
Drug

trial
to

whether

cross

the

property, he answered: "It was during the period of time t h a t Mr. Homer
was a l e s s e e of Mr. Dewey."

Record a t 1661.

Mr. Smith a l s o expressed

some confusion a t t r i a l when asked whether h i s i n t e r r o g a t o r y answer
(paragraph 8, above) would s t i l l be h i s testimony today.
"Well, as I understand i t , y e s . "

He answered,

Id. a t 1690. 7

' Homer a l s o p r o t e s t e d t h a t the Smiths' testimony was hearsay and was e l i c i t e d
through l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s .
Homer b r i e f at 24. The q u e s t i o n s posed t o t h e Smiths
concerning whether t h e Smiths and Deweys granted each other permission t o c r o s s t h e i r
property did not c a l l for hearsay.
The w i t n e s s e s were never asked t o r e l a t e a
c o n v e r s a t i o n , but were asked whether permission was extended by t h e Smiths t o the
Deweys and v i c e v e r s a . In a d d i t i o n , questions posed t o the w i t n e s s e s did not suggest
an answer. The q u e s t i o n s posed, for example were: "Did you and Mr. Smith permit the
Deweys t o have a c c e s s through property, across your property?" Record a t 1639. That
q u e s t i o n c a l l s for a yes or no answer. F i n a l l y , although counsel o b j e c t e d t o Mr.
S e s s i o n s ' asking Reed Smith leading questions during Mr. S e s s i o n s ' c r o s s examination
of him (Homer and t h e Steurs c a l l e d Reed Smith as t h e i r f i r s t w i t n e s s ) , on d i r e c t
examination of Mr. Smith, he was asked at length about the Smiths' arrangement with
t h e Deweys concerning c r o s s i n g each o t h e r s ' property without hearsay and leading
q u e s t i o n o b j e c t i o n s by counsel. See record at 1657-1662.
As a p r a c t i c a l matter, in p r e s c r i p t i v e easement c a s e s , evidence of
permission t o use t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e often c a l l s for hearsay. Indeed, some evidence
t h a t permission was not granted c a l l s for hearsay. Since evidence of permissive use
rebuts any presumption of adverse use, the evidence must be allowed.
Significantly,
Mr. and Mrs. Smith were a v a i l a b l e for cross-examination concerning t h e i r a s s e r t i o n s
t h a t they granted permission t o the Deweys t o use t h e i r property. Mrs. Smith was not
cross-examined.
Mr. Smith was cross-examined only concerning whether he extended
permission t o Homer and concerning h i s interrogatory answer, o u t l i n e d above. Record
a t 1687-90.
In case a f t e r c a s e , permission evidence i s e l i c i t e d through hearsay.
E . g . , Cope v . Cope, 493 P.2d 336 (Mont. 1972); Garmond v. Kinnev, 91 N.M. 646, 579
P.2d 178 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Thompson v. S c o t t . 528 P.2d 509 (Or. 1974).

2. Sandy Hills9 Permission Evidence is not Barred
by its Failure to Plead it as an Affirmative Defense.
Homer complains that since Sandy Hills did not plead permission as
an affirmative defense, any evidence of permission was improperly
received. Homer did not move to strike testimony regarding permission
and only objected to it on Reed Smith's cross-examination (record at
991), but did not object to it on Mr. Smith's direct examination,
record at 1655-69, and did not object to it on the grounds that it was
not pled as an affirmative defense on Barbara Smith's direct examination.

Record at 1631-55. Moreover, Homer chose not to cross-examine

Barbara Smith.

Homer did cross-examine Reed Smith on the issue of

permission. Record at 1689-90. Interrogatories that were submitted to
Sandy Hills by Homer included inquiries as to the expected testimony of
witnesses.

Sandy Hills answered, indicating that Reed Smith would

testify that the Deweys had permission to cross Sandy Hills' property.
See addendum hereto (under local rule, interrogatories and answers are
not filed with the court, but are retained by the parties).
Importantly, Sandy Hills denied in its answer that Homer had
obtained a prescriptive easement to cross Sandy Hills' property in the
front or in the rear, record at 84-104, and affirmatively defended
Homer's claims on the basis that Homer's complaint failed to state a
claim on which relief could be granted.

Sandy Hills' permission

defense certainly can fall under the denials in the answer and the
failure-to-state-a-claim affirmative defense.
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows liberal
amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence:
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time,

even a f t e r judgment; but f a i l u r e so t o amend does not a f f e c t
t h e r e s u l t of t h e t r i a l of these i s s u e s .
If evidence i s
objected t o a t the t r i a l on the ground t h a t i t i s not w i t h i n
t h e i s s u e s made by t h e pleadings, t h e court may allow t h e
pleadings t o be amended when the p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e m e r i t s of
t h e a c t i o n w i l l be subserved thereby and t h e objecting p a r t y
f a i l s t o s a t i s f y the court t h a t the admission of such evidence
would p r e j u d i c e him in maintaining h i s action or defense upon
t h e m e r i t s . The court s h a l l grant a continuance, i f necessary,
t o enable t h e objecting party t o meet such evidence.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (emphasis added).
F i n a l l y , Homer did not appeal any i s s u e s t o t h i s c o u r t .

Failure to

do so c o n s t i t u t e s a waiver of h i s r i g h t t o claim t h a t t h e c o u r t erred
in t h e allowing of c e r t a i n evidence.
3.

Presumptions of Permissive Use Defeat8 Homer's
Claims of Prescriptive Easement.

a. Sandv H i l l s opened a way across i t s property which was used
by Sandy H i l l s 1 neighbors without causing damage which r a i s e d
a Presumption of Permission.
Homer makes t h e i n c r e d i b l e argument t h a t Sandy H i l l s did not open
ways a c r o s s i t s property because S a l t Lake City designated t h e l o c a t i o n
of t h e curb cut in t h e front and because t h e ways extended across
Homers p r o p e r t y .

The f a c t t h a t S a l t Lake City announced where t h e

curb cut would be located i s immaterial.
across t h e i r property.

The curb cut simply accommodated p h y s i c a l entry

from t h e s t r e e t t o t h e property.

The f a c t t h a t they ways extended

across Homer f s property i s a l s o immaterial.
several properties.

The Smiths opened t h e way

Ways often extend across

In Sdrales v. Rondos, 116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562

Homer argues t h a t even i f the f a c t s of the case do g i v e r i s e t o presumptions
of permissive use of t h e claimed easements, weightier p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d i c t a t e
t h a t t h e presumption of adverse use which a r i s e s when one has used a n o t h e r ' s property
openly, n o t o r i o u s l y and continuously for the p r e s c r i p t i v e period w i l l govern. (Sandy
H i l l s , as s e t f o r t h above, vigorously disputes t h a t Homer e s t a b l i s h e d h i s or h i s
p r e d e c e s s o r s ' use of Sandy H i l l s ' property openly, n o t o r i o u s l y and continuously for
20 y e a r s . )
Notwithstanding, many courts have held t h a t p r e s c r i p t i v e easements are
not favored i n t h e law. Shumate v. Robinson, 52 Or. App. 199, 627 P.2d 1295, 1297
(Ct. App. 1981); Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356, 613 P.2d 367, 369
(1980).
Indeed, i n Homer's c a s e , Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314
( 1 9 6 6 ) , t h e Court s t a t e d t h a t the presumption of adverse use i s not a b s o l u t e and does
not preclude an owner from proving that the use was p e r m i s s i v e . Thus, i t appears t h a t
"weightier" p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s would favor a permissive presumption over an adverse
one.

(1949),

for example,

the alley over which defendants

claimed a

prescriptive easement extended across the full widths of plaintiffs'
and defendants1 property. 209 P.2d at 563 (description of alleyway and
accompanying sketch).
The critical element is that if a property owner opens a way for
access to his property that is also used by others without causing
damage, the use is presumed to be permissive. Buckley v. Cox. 122 Utah
151, 247 P.2d 277 (1949); Sdrales v. Rondos. 116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562
(1949) ; Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Cache County Poultry Growers Ass'n.
116 Utah 258, 209 P.2d 251 (1949); Zollinger v. Frank. 110 Utah 514,
175 P.2d 714 (1946).

The Court in Buckley stated:

A presumption well established in this state is that where
a person opens a way for the use of his own premises, and
another person also uses it without causing damage, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, such use by the latter is
permissive, and not under a claim of right. . . . It was
defendants burden to overcome this presumption and to
establish his claim by clear and convincing evidence.
247 P.2d at 279-80 (citing Jensen v. Gerrard. 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070
(1935); Savage v. Nielsen. 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948); Sdrales v.
Rondos. 116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562 (1949); and Cache Valley Banking Co.
v. Cache County Poultry Growers Ass'n. 116 Utah 258, 209 P.2d 251
(1949)).
Homer's contention at page 30 of his brief that Homerfs and his
Predecessors1 use of Sandy Hills1 property "did impose a significant
burden on the property and interfered with its unrestricted use by
Sandy Hills and its Predecessors," is unsupported by evidence, and
indeed, Homer offers no record support for the contention. The test is
not whether use interferes with unrestricted access, but whether use
caused damage.
damage•

There is no evidence that Homerfs use (if any) caused

b.
The Smiths' and Dewevs' family relationship raises a
presumption that the use of each others1 property was
permissive and not under a claim of right.
Homer focuses on the year 1947 and the circumstances surrounding
the Deweys' purchase of their property in an effort to show that the
Smiths1
hostile,

and the Deweys1 relationship over the next 30 years was
Mr. Smith testified that he and his wife reluctantly sold

adjacent property to the Deweys
later date.111

lff

because we wanted to develop it at a

Record at 1694 (quoting Reed Smith's deposition).

Mr.

Smith agreed that the Smiths sold the property to the Deweys to keep
the family peace.

"'This endeavor in Salt Lake was purely our own

until that point in time when [sic] we intended to keep it that way
without family entanglements, and we were disappointed in the fact that
[the Deweys] did move from Odgen to Salt Lake at about this time.'1'
Record at 1695 (quoting Reed Smith's deposition).
Of course, if the Smiths were not interested in maintaining a close
and cordial family relationship with the Deweys, they could have ousted
Mr. Dewey from the property after the weekend he began excavating the
property prior to its sale to him. See record at 1694 (Mr. Dewey began
excavating one weekend while the Smiths were away).

Instead, to

maintain family peace, the Smiths sold the property to the Deweys.
Despite Homer's assertions to the contrary, there is evidence that the
Smith and Dewey relationship was close and cordial over the next thirty
years prior to Mrs. Dewey's death in 1976 (Mr. Dewey preceded her in
death).
For example, the Smiths paid Mr. Dewey to help in the construction
of the Sandy Hills building.

Record at 1636, 1693.

The Smiths and

Deweys permitted each other to cross their respective properties.
Record at 1637a-39, 1648-53, 1657, 1660-61. The Smiths paid Mr. Dewey
to work on their duplex fronting on Yuma Street.

Record at 1644. Mr.

Smith, later joined by Mr. Dewey, petitioned Salt Lake City for
permission to construct a parking lot on the east portions of Lots 1
and 2 of Lichfield Gardens owned by the Smiths and on Lots 3 and 4,
owned by the Deweys. Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey presented an agreement to
the Lichfield Gardens lot owners to modify the restrictive covenants to
allow a parking lot. Record at 907-910. Mr. Smith, Mr. Dewey and Mrs.
Callister all agreed that the rear parking was for patrons only.
Record at 1069. Mr. Dewey and Mr. Smith expressed concern over parking
in the alley (26-foot right-of-way) that occurred after Sprouse-Reitz
tenancy of Mrs. Canister's (now Steurs1) property.

Record at 1074.

Importantly, there is no evidence that after the Smiths sold
property to the Deweys, their relationship was other than close and
cordial.

Contrary to Homerfs argument, Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d

356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966), certainly did not overrule Rippentrop v.
Pickering, 15 Utah 2d 59, 387 P.2d 94 (1963), or Lunt v. Kitchens, 123
Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 (1953).
Lunt as authority.

In fact, the Richins Court cited to

412 P.2d at 316 n.8.

Courts in other jurisdictions also recognize that a familial
relationship will normally indicate permissive use of family member's
property.

In Cope v. Cope, 493 P.2d 336 (Mont. 1972), the Montana

Supreme Court noted that
it is a general principle of law that members of a family may
not acquire an easement by prescription against each other in
the absence of a showing of a clear, positive, and continued
disclaimer and disavowal of title.
Id. at 338 (emphasis added).

The Court reversed the trial court's

finding of a prescriptive easement based on the family relationship of
the users and on testimony that use was by permission.
The same circumstances were presented at trial below.

First, the

Smiths testified that the Deweys used their property with permission,

and second, because of their family relationship, it can be presumed
that the use was permissive.9
4.

Joint Driveway Cases do not Apply to the Facts of this Case.

Homer obdurately insists that joint (or boundary-line) driveway
cases govern the facts and circumstances of this case.

Homer goes so

far as to claim that
the policy considerations in Richins fv. Struhs. 17 Utah 2d
356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966)] refutes the disingenuous claim made
by Sandy Hills that the dispositive fact which distinguishes
Richins from Lunt Tv. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535
(1953)] and this case is whether the adjoining properties are
"vertically bisected" or "horizontally transacted [sic]" by the
claimed easement. Those geometrical distinctions are wholly
immaterial and irrelevant.
Homer brief at 34.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Friend v. Holcombe, 162 P.2d 1008
(Okla. 1945), cited as authority Johnson v. Whelan. 171 Okla. 243, 42
P.2d 882 (1935), a case relied on by Homer.

The Friend Court stated:

The [mutual use] rule is narrow in its application. It
applies when two owners of adjacent property construct a
driveway, one-half of which is on the land of each and holds
that the continuing use of such a driveway is in effect adverse
and should be so treated. That when such use has continued for
the statutory period of 15 years each of the parties has an
easement on the land of the other for the continuing use of the
driveway. The rule has no application in this case.
Defendant in error, plaintiff below, has failed to call
our attention to any case where the mutual use rule or mutual
use exception has been applied to a roadway which consecutively
crosses the land of different owners and our own research fails
to reveal such a case.
162 P.2d at 1011 (emphasis added).
Indeed, Homer ignores the language of his own authority. In Jacobs
v. Brewster, 190 S.W. 2d 894 (Mo. 1945), the Court explained that "one
who joins his adjacent landowner in the construction of a paved private

Q

As set forth in point I.B., evidence presented by Homer established public use
of Sandy Hills' property. Record at 1279-80, 1333-34. Public use of a way is presumed to be permissive. Read v. Pokey. 92 Or. App. 298, 758 P.2d 399, 400 (Ct. App.
1988).

way over and along the medial line has given such adjacent owner more
than a mere license."

Id. at 900. The Utah Supreme Court in Richins

v. Struhs recognized the significance of the construction of the
driveway and bridge along the common boundary between the properties:
[The former owners1] respective families collaborated in
constructing this driveway and bridge between the two
properties on what was assumed to be the boundary: that it was
for their joint use; that it was so used and maintained so long
as they owned the property.
. . . On the contrary when it is considered in the light
of the principles of law and equity herein discussed, it is our
opinion that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the
facts here shown, where the parties (predecessors) jointly
established and used a driveway on what they thought their
common boundary [footnote 10], is that the use meets the
requirement of being open, notorious, continuous and adverse
for more than 20 years and therefore has established a
prescriptive right to continue to so use it.
412 P.2d at 316-17 (emphasis added).

In its footnote 10, the Court

stated:
That the use of a driveway on common boundary, partly on
land of each for prescriptive period results in easement see
Thompson on Real Property, Vol.2, § 345 (1961 Replacement)[.]
Id. at n.10.
Other real property authorities recognize the joint driveway or
"mutual use11 rule. The Colorado Supreme Court in Trueblood v. Pierce.
179 P.2d 671 (1947), quoted 28 CJ.S. Easements § 18:
"Where adjoining proprietors lay out a way or alley between
their lands, each devoting a part of his own land to that
purpose, and the way or alley is used for the prescriptive
period by the respective owners or their successors in title,
neither can obstruct or close the part which is on his own
land; and in these circumstances the mutual use of the whole of
the way or alley will be considered adverse to a separate and
exclusive use by either party."
179 P.2d at 678.
Put another way:
In the case of a private way or alley lving over and along
the boundary between lots or tracts of land that has been used
without interruption by adjoining owners for the full
prescriptive period for a common purpose, the user of each
owner is generally regarded as adverse to the other so as to

establish an easement by prescription in either owner against
the other.
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 45 (1966).
In this case, there exists no driveway, alley or way along the
boundary lines between the Sandy Hills and Homer properties.

Indeed,

there is no evidence that Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey jointly constructed
any kind of a way.

The evidence is that Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey

separately constructed their commercial buildings and the parking areas
to the east (front). Record at 923-24.

Although Mr. Smith and Mr.

Dewey collaborated in gaining permission to construct the rear parking
area (once Mr. Smith had begun the process), record at 907-10, the
parties developed Lots 1 and 2 (Smiths) and Lots 3 and 4 (Deweys)
separately.

Record at 1656.

5. The Smiths1 Transfer of their Property
to a Family Corporation did not Revoke their Permission
to the Deweys to Cross their Property.
The cases relied by Sandy Hills in its main brief, Cooper v. Boise
Church of Christ. 96 Idaho 45, 524 P.2d 173 (1974), and Citv of
Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324 (Alaska 1975), present a more
sensible approach to the question of permission extended by a property
owner once the property owner transfers its property. The Idaho Court
held that permission may continue after the transfer of the licensor's
property if the new owner does not object to the use and the licensee's
use is not inconsistent with the rights of the new owner.

524 P.2d at

176.

revoke the

The Alaska

Court held that the transfer may

permission, but that such revocation does not necessarily mean that the
new use is adverse.
adverse.

The licensee mush establish that the new use is

530 P.2d at 1330.

Significantly, when the Smiths transferred their property to Smith
Investment Company in 1965, exhibit 3-P, the Deweys were still the

owners of their property.

Exhibits 7-P and 10-P.

Reed and Barbara

Smith were the president and vice-president, respectively, of the Smith
Investment Company.

Record at 798-99.

Thus the people the Deweys

dealt with remained Reed and Barbara Smith. Under such circumstances,
for the Deweys1 use to have become adverse, the Deweys must have
communicated their rejection of any further permissive use on their
part.

Otherwise, they would have in effect "sneak[ed] up" on the

Smiths by using their property under permission and then, after a lapse
of time, claimed they were using it as a matter of right.

See Richins

v. Struhs. 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, 316 (1966).

6.

Homer Could not Tack to the Deweys* Use.

Homerfs predecessor, Bonneville Drug, acquired the Homer building
and the property to the east of it in 1976.

Exhibit 7-P.

Bonneville

Drug acquired the east portions of Lots 3 and 4, Lichfield Gardens, in
1982.

Exhibit 13-P.

In 1988, Bonneville Drug conveyed all of this

property to Homer. Exhibit 14-P. Consequently, in order for Homer to
establish a prescriptive use in himself, he must be able to tack his
use to the use of his predecessors. Sandy Hills does not dispute that
Utah allows tacking for the purpose of establishing the prescriptive
period.

Sandy Hills does not dispute that a tenant can originate

adverse possession in his landlordfs favor i,f the lease expressly or
impliedly includes the use of the claimed easement.

Dereaibus v.

Silberman Furniture Co.. 186 A.2d 553, 555 (Conn. 1936), after retrial,
197 A. 760 (Conn. 1938). 10
Sandy Hills vigorously disputes that Bonneville Drug's lease
included, expressly or impliedly, the right of Bonneville Drug to use
10
Homer'8 statement that Sandy Hills overlooked or disregarded the second (1938)
Dereaibus opinion is petty. The second Dereaibus opinion an appeal of the retrial
ordered in the first opinion and added nothing new to the law stated in the first
opinion. Sandy Hills quoted from the first Dereaibus in its main brief that the right
to use the claimed easement may be implied in the lease* Sandy Hills' brief at 31.

the claimed easement. Reed Smith testified that so long as the Deweys
owned their property, the permission the Smiths extended to the Deweys
to use Sandy Hills1 property also extended to the Deweys1 lessees.
Record at 1661. Homer's testimony regarding his lease established that
use

of

the

claimed

easement

was

neither

express

nor

implied,

notwithstanding his acknowledgment on cross-examination that access was
important to him.

Record at 1276-77. In fact, Mr. Homer testified on

cross-examination as follows:
Q. . . . There's no question about the fact, is there, Mr. Homer,
in your mind, but that Mr. Dewey gave you permission to have your
customers come in and out of the parking area that you have
labeled, if I can read it, C and B; is there?
A.

Mr. Dewey didn't give me permission.

Q.

Did he withhold permission?

A.

No.

Q. So, in other words, I take it—you negotiated the lease on
behalf of Bonneville Drug, didn't you?
A.

That is correct.

Q. And I take it one of the most important things to you as a
pharmacist would be to be certain that customers of your drugstore
were able to get in and out of that property; true?
A.

That's correct.

Q. So I take it, Mr. Homer, that it was important to you, in terms
of the negotiation of the lease, that Mr. Dewey give you permission
to have your customers come in and out?
A.

That was not stated in the lease, that I can remember.

Q. We don't have what it states because you don't have a copy of
it; do you?
A.

No, sir.

A. You tell us, Mr. Homer, of any instance you can recall in the
negotiations of the lease when your landlord said you can't have
your customers come in or out of B or C.
[Objection
deceased.]

sustained

based

on

hearsay,

statement

from

Q. Okay. Under that, your understanding of the lease agreements,
Mr. Homer, are terms, if you would, whether or not your customers
were permitted, by that landlord, to come into your business?
A.

They just case in.

There was no permission granted.

Q. Isnft it true, sir, that when you took occupancy of the Homer
building and ran the drug store, you thought this was a public
thoroughfare, that is, ingress and egress to and from your
building? And you believed it was a public thoroughfare?
A.

I believed it was a parking lot for a certain number.

Q.

You thought it was a public thoroughfare?

A.

Thought it was a parking lot for a strip mall.

Q. I have you turn to your deposition there, Mr. Homer, and have
you look there at page 43.
Do you have that page in front of you, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

That says:

Do you see line eight?

"Question:
So the assumption when you
property through Bonneville Drug w a s — "
,f

Answer:

bought the

Right—"

Question continued:
••—That it was simply a public
access to the shopping center from 13th South and from 21st
East, is that right?"
And what was your answer, sir?
A.

"Yes."

Q.

Do you still have that belief today, sir?

A.

In laymanfs terms, that's probably correct.

Q. So, you believed at the time that you commenced business in the
Homer building, as depicted on Exhibit 35-P, that there was public
access from Points B and C on 21st East and public access from
Points C and B coming off of 1300 South; didnft you?
A.

We had customers come in the place.

Q. Was your understanding, just like you told us under oath in
your deposition, that that constituted public access? Correct?
A.

The public came in and out of it.

Record at 1276-1280.
From the above testimony, it is apparent that Mr. Dewey and Mr.
Homer had no conversations concerning access to the Homer building.
Mr. Homer has made no claim that his initial written lease, which was
orally renewed, record at 1278, contained any provision regarding
access to the Homer building. Mr. Homer1s belief that there was public
access through Points B and C belies any implied right of Homer to use
those access points under the lease. Under such circumstances, it can
hardly be said that the use of Sandy Hills' property in the front or
the rear was expressed in the lease or implied under it. Accordingly,
Homer cannot tack his (and Bonneville Drug's) use as owner of the
property to Bonneville Drug's use as a tenant.
C

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING HOMER TO
REMOVE THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE UPPER
STORY OF THE HOMER BUILDING FROM SANDY HILLS1 BUILDING
As set forth in Sandy Hills' main brief, the elements of boundary
by acquiescence were not met with respect to the encroachment of the
upper story of the Homer building onto the Sandy Hills building.

The

trial court found "occupation of the respective buildings of the
parties to a visible line marked bv the parties' abutting walls."
Record at 724, 726 (Finding of Fact 2 relating to Counterclaim of Sandy
Hills against Homer).

If the abutting walls marked the visible in

which the parties acquiesced, id., then the upper story encroachment
over that line was required to be removed.

Homer now argues, for the

first time on appeal, that the visible line was the line marked by the
abutting walls of the buildings "including the visible line marked bv
the upper portion of the north wall."

Homer brief at 44 (emphasis

added).

That, however was not the finding of the trial court and was

not the position advanced by Homer below.11
Homer now improperly argues, also for the first time on appeal,
that

assuming

the

trial

court

erred

in

finding

boundary

by

acquiescence, under the balance of injury test, a court may exercise
its discretion not to grant

injunctive relief when there

is no

irreparable harm from the violation and the cost of removing the
encroachment would be disproportionate and great compared to the
benefit to be derived from its removal.

Homer's articulating the

balance of injury test reveals that it will not work for him.

Homer

presented no evidence of the cost of removing the encroachment. Simply
stating that it will be expensive is not enough for the court to
balance the injury.

By contrast, Sandy Hills presented extensive

evidence of the serious harm caused by the encroachment.
Jack Shockey, a roofer hired by Sandy Hills to inspect and repair
the roof of the Sandy Hills building, testified that the Sandy Hills
roof did not leak, but that the north walls of the upper story of the
Homer building were badly deteriorated and that water ran down those
walls into the Sandy Hills building which was causing serious water
damage to the ceiling. Record at 1540-1555. He also testified that in
his opinion if the encroachment of the upper story of the Sandy Hills
building did not exist, water would not run down the walls of the upper
story of the Homer building into the Sandy Hills building.
1557-58.

Record at

He acknowledged that if there were a common wall (one wall)

between the two buildings, the water would run down either or both
11

In his trial brief, Homer contended that Sandy Hills' encroachment claim must

fail:
First, the abutting walls of the Homer building and the Sandy Hills building
have been fixed and unchanged since the mid- or late-1950s.
Their
properties have clearly been occupied up to the visible line marked by their
abutting walls and there has been mutual acquiescence in those abutting
walls as the boundary line.

sides, record at 1558, but Reed Smith testified that the walls were
abutting walls, not one common wall.
Accordingly,

even

under

the

Record at 926.
balance

of

injury

test,

the

encroachment should have been ordered removed.
II.
A.

REPLY TO THE STEURS' BRIEF

THE IMPROVEMENTS PLACED BY THE STEURS IN THE
26-FOOT RIGHT-OF-WAY IMPERMISSIBLY
REDUCED ITS WIDTH

The right-of-way that Mrs. Callister conveyed to the Deweys and the
Smiths over the northerly 26 feet of her property provided for two
lanes of traffic for use by the "Grantees, their heirs and assigns,
suppliers, customers and repairmen." Exhibit S-10. The 1953 Agreement
signed by Mr. Dewey, Mr. Smith and Mrs. Callister, exhibit S-6, which
was referenced in the Callister to Smith and Dewey right-of-way deed,
provided that Mrs. Callister would give Smith and Dewey a right-of-way
over approximately the northerly 26 and 1/2 feet of her property "to be
used and usable by [Smith, Dewey and Callister] and the customers of
the businesses of the parties to give access to the lands abovedescribed for business purposes and parking . . . ."

Exhibit S-6.

Mrs. Callister also agreed to provide a "sidewalk of at least three
feet in width along one side [of the right-of-way] to be used "in
conjunction" with the sidewalk Smith and Dewey would provide along the
easterly portion of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Lichfield Gardens.

Id.

During the 1950s, Mrs. Callister installed a sidewalk along the
north side of her building (the south side of the right-of-way) which
was three feet wide, flush with the asphalt at the east end and raised
perhaps two inches at the west end.

Record at 1059.

In 1986, the

Steurs replaced the old sidewalk with a five-foot sidewalk which was
raised five inches from the level of the asphalt.

Steur brief at 13.

In addition, the Steurs constructed a one-foot, raised curb on the

north side of the a l l e y .

Record at 299, 301-02.

The

five-foot

sidewalk and one-foot curb reduced the width of the right-of-way for
vehicle use.

Record at 340-41.

The Steurs argue, however, that prior to putting in the improvements , the right-of-way was 26.8 feet wide and after the improvements
were put in the right-of-way was 26.8 feet wide.
This argument i s inane.
rians or v e h i c l e s ,
pedestrians.

Steur brief at 11.

The one-foot curb i s not useable by pedest-

and the five-foot

sidewalk i s only useable by

Thus, the width of the right-of-way now travelable by

v e h i c l e s i s 20.8 f e e t wide, a reduction of s i x f e e t . 1 2
The Steurs argue that these improvements do not c o n s t i t u t e a breach
of the deed of right-of-way or of the 1953 Agreement because the l a t t e r
c a l l s for a sidewalk "at l e a s t three feet in width, 11 and the f i v e - f o o t
sidewalk i s at l e a s t three feet wide.

According t o the Steurs, the

Agreement did not limit the maximum width of the sidewalk.

While that

i s true, the Steurs would have to concede that the Agreement and deed
of right-of-way would not allow a sidewalk which was a f u l l 26 f e e t
wide, or half that, or even a third of the 26-foot width of the r i g h t of-way.
The term "at l e a s t three feet in width" i s ambiguous.

Although Mr.

Smith agreed that he was aware of no document which required the threefoot

sidewalk t o be flush with the asphalt,

record at

1062,

he

explained on cross-examination that the parties discussed improvements
t o be made in the right-of-way and agreed that they "would be i n s t a l l e d
in a manner that made very easy access for large u n i t s , large trucks."

12

The Steurs argue that the reduction in width of the right-of-way, at most, i s
three f e e t , since the original sidewalk was three feet wide.
This ignores the
uncontradicted evidence that the old sidewalk was flush with the asphalt at the east
end and raised only one to two inches at the west end* Record at 1059. Mr. Smith
t e s t i f i e d that use of the f u l l 26 and 1/2 feet was available even with the old
sidewalk. Record at 1060-61.

Record at 1060.

Mr. Smith testified that the parties agreed on the

thickness of the asphalt and that
[t]he purpose of a driveway was an alleyway for entrance by
trucks, by patrons, by whatever. But we had the full use,
utilization of 26-and-a-half feet.
Record at 1061.13
The Steurs claim that defendants' argument that the sidewalk could
be no more than three feet wide would require the court to rewrite the
Agreement.

The defendants do not and have not ever argued that the

sidewalk could be only three feet in width. The argument was that the
sidewalk could not reduce the useable width of the right-of-way by
vehicles.

In other words, the installation of a raised sidewalk and

13

The Steurs assert that the Agreement was unambiguous regarding the requirement
of a sidewalk at least three feet in width; therefore, Mr, Smith's testimony as to
the parties' intent is irrelevant. The parol evidence rule prohibits extrinsic
evidence offered to vary the terms of an unambiguous agreement. Bullouah v. Sims,
16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965); however, Mr. Smith testified about an oral
agreement of the parties concerning the dimensions of the sidewalk which transpired
about three years after the Agreement was signed. In such a case, the parol evidence
rule does not prohibit such evidence. See Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (extrinsic evidence allowed to determine parties' intent in modifying
lease)•
As set forth above, the sidewalk provision, "at least three feet in width," is
ambiguous as to width but it is also ambiguous as to height. Therefore parol evidence
was admissible to explain the parties' intent. Even if an agreement is unambiguous,
however,
when the parties place their own construction on it and so
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of
what their true intention was.
Bullouah v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965).
Steurs also claim that the trial court was free to disbelieve Mr. Smith's
testimony. The strongest corroboration of Mr. Smith's testimony about the intent of
the parties in constructing a three-foot sidewalk flush with the asphalt is the old
sidewalk itself, which was three feet wide and essentially flush with the surface of
the right-of-way.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
The fact that evidence is "uncontradicted" may be persuasive, or in some
instances even conclusive. • • • One of the most salutary features of our
system of government is that throughout its entire structure there are
checks and balances . . . . This is the basis for the right of review on
appeal whereby a court or iurv may be prevented from obdurately refusing to
accept credible uncontradicted evidence without any rational basis for doing
so.
Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966).

curb violated the agreement because it reduced the vehicle-useable
width of the right-of-way by six feet.14
Arguing that the trial court was required to construe the 1953
Agreement as a whole and harmonize its provisions, the Steurs justify
the five-foot wide, five-inch high sidewalk by pointing to the sidewalk
of the same dimensions lying along the east edge of the 50-foot rightof-way on the Homer and Sandy Hills property.

"The defendants never

claimed that they had violated the Agreement by constructing their
sidewalk." Steur brief at 13. Of course defendants did not claim they
violated the Agreement and neither did the Steurs.

The fifty-foot

right-of-way on the Homer and Sandy Hills property has a function much
different from the 26-foot right-of-way on the Steur property.

The

Agreement provides in paragraph 4:
First Parties [Smith and Dewey] agree to provide parking
spaces on approximately two-thirds of said Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4,
as diminished by necessary boundaries, shrubs, lawns, barriers
and sidewalks as prescribed by the Planning and Zoning
Commission of Salt Lake City and as shall be agreed between the
parties and to make parking spaces for eighteen automobiles on
said lands available for the customers of Second Party [Mrs.
Callister], the parking spaces to be arranged so as to give
effective ingress and egress to and from the parking lot at
13th South as well as 21st East with as much expedition as can
reasonably be arranged consistent with the needs of all the
parties to parking a large number of automobiles.
Exhibit S-6 (emphasis added). The deed of right-of-way from the Deweys
and Smiths to Mrs. Callister provides in pertinent part that the
grantors granted to Mrs. Callister a right-of-way of
[a] portion not less than 50 feet in width from East
to West along the Easterly portion of [Lots 1, 2, 3
and 4 ], except where shrubs, curbs and grades are
required by the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning
Commission, and except where buildings of the
Grantors and uses accessory thereto occupy the
extreme Easterly portion of said tract, which uses
u

The Steurs discuss at length the sidewalk but ignore the one-foot curb on the
north side of the right-of-way. There is no provision in the Agreement or deed of
right-of-way calling for such a curb and it clearly reduces the width of the right-ofway for all purposes—vehicular and pedestrian*

shall not reduce the width of the right of way to
less than 50 feet.
Together with free ingress and egress for the Grantee, her
heirs and assigns, in common with the Grantors, their heirs and
assigns, customers and other persons permitted by Grantors to
use said area with the right in Grantee, her heirs and assigns
to use portions of said area sufficient to park eighteen (18)
automobiles of customers of Grantee, her heirs and assigns
•

• • •

Exhibit S-10 (emphasis added).

Thus, the 50-foot right-of-way was to

be used not only for ingress and egress, but also for parking.

The

Agreement recognized that the parking area would be diminished by
sidewalks and other uses.
The Steurs1 explain that the improvements they placed in the rightof-way did not obstruct traffic, but "may have slightly favored
pedestrian traffic at the expense of vehicular traffic . . . ." Steur
brief at 15.

The Agreement does not provide that pedestrian traffic

can be favored over vehicular traffic, and the right-of-way deed,
exhibit S-ll, does not mention pedestrian traffic at all.

The fact

that the Agreement provides for a right-of-way of a specified width
without designating a width for pedestrians and a width for vehicles
would indicate that neither use could be favored over the other. With
the previous sidewalk being constructed flush with the right-of-way
surface, neither use was favored.
entire width,
sidewalk.

Pedestrians could walk upon the

and vehicles, if necessary,

could

drive upon the

The Steurs upset this balance by reducing the width of the

right-of-way for vehicles, and this they were not entitled to do.
Thus, Squaw Peak Community Covenant Church of Phoenix v. Anozira
Development, Inc.. 719 P.2d 295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), does apply.
When the terms of the easement are clear, the easement owner is
entitled to the full enjoyment of the easement as spelled out in the
conveyance, regardless of whether the owner uses the entire easement.

Id* at 299-300•

In addition, Consolidated Amusement Co. v. Waikiki

Business Plaza, Inc., 719 P.2d 1119 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986), does not
favor the Steurs. The sidewalk placed in the easement for pedestrian
purposes was agreed to by the parties subsequent to the granting of the
easement.

The

parties1

agreement

then

called

for

a

five-foot

pedestrian passageway and a five-foot roadway, the latter of which
would become a pedestrian easement if vehicular use ceased.

The later

construction of permanent improvements in the pedestrian passageway by
the defendant in Consolidated Amusement violated the easement because
it reduced its width.

Id. at 1122, 1123.

The Steurs1 sidewalk and

curb were not placed pursuant to agreement, but over the vigorous
dissent of Sandy Hills.
B.

THE STEURS1 IMPROVEMENTS MADE THE RIGHT-OF-WAY
LESS INVITING TO SUPPLIERS

The properties owned by the parties to this action are commercial.
The Steurs attempt to trivialize the need for reasonable access to
Sandy

Hills1

property

by

commercial

suppliers

by

noting

that

"defendants1 whole argument is based on one word in the Deed of Right
of Way."

Steur brief at 19. The word is "suppliers:"

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said right of way to the said Grantees,
their heirs and assigns, suppliers, customers and repairmen •
. . .

Exhibit S-ll.

Access by suppliers would not have been more important

had it been mentioned twice.
The "red herring"—the ability of a medium-sized delivery truck
(50-foot

tractor/trailer

combination)

to

access the

Sandy

Hills

property through the 26-foot right-of-way—was created by the Steurs,
not by Sandy Hills.

As a consequence of the Steurs1 improvements in

the right-of-way, the right-of-way has lost utility for large delivery
trucks.

Jack De Mass1 uncontradicted testimony and evidence was that

as

a

result

of

the

raised,

five-foot

sidewalk,

a

50-foot

tractor/trailer could not make a right-hand turn off 2100 East into the
right-of-way without either crossing the double yellow line in 2100
East or driving up over the sidewalk which would cause the sidewalk to
be "busted out of that, out of there, in short order" if the sidewalk
were not reinforced.

Record at 1497-98.

The significance of this evidence is that it demonstrates the
damage to Sandy Hills caused by the Steurs1 improvements.

It is

immaterial that at the time of trial, the Sandy Hills building was
unleased and therefore, there was no need for large trucks to access
the building.

It is immaterial that during the 10 years preceding

trial, the Sandy Hills building was occupied by a fabric store which
had no need for access to the building by large trucks.

It is

material, however, that the Steurs reduced the width of the easement in
contravention of the 1953 Agreement and the deed of right-of-way,
regardless of whether the reduction caused damage. It is material that
the reduction of the right-of-way adversely impacted the present
ability of large vehicles to access the property.
In Aladdin Petroleum Corp v. Gold Crown Properties, Inc.. 221 Kan.
579, 561 P.2d 818 (1977), the Court held:
[W]here the width, length and location of an easement for
ingress and egress have been expressly set forth in the
instrument the easement is specific and definite.
The
expressed terms of the grant or reservation are controlling in
such case and considerations of what may be necessary or
reasonable to a present use of the dominant estate are not
controlling.
561 P.2d at 822 (citing 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 805 (3d ed. 1939);
28 C.J.S. Easements § 75 (emphasis added).
In Aladdin, the Court also held that carports erected in the rightof-way (which did not prevent access, but merely reduced the width of
the right-of-way) violated the easement. "Construction of carports or

other permanent obstructions over a portion of an easement for passage
of a definite width wrongfully

impairs

and

interferes with the

privilege of passage which the owner of the definite easement holds."
Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
This case involves an easement of definite dimensions; therefore,
the size of suppliers1 vehicles in 1954, when the easement was created,
does not control.15

Sandy Hills is entitled to the use of the full

width of the easement and the Steurs1 reduction of that width is
impacting the ability of present-day suppliers to access the right-ofway.

It is immaterial that there may not be a present need for such

suppliers to access the right-of-way—Sandy Hills is not confined to
leasing its property only to tenants who do not require access by large
delivery vehicles.
The Steurs argue that the barrier erected by Sandy Hills along the
south boundary of Lot 2 prevents anyone from accessing one of the Sandy
Hills1 building1s two back doors; therefore, Sandy Hills does not need
the 26-foot right of way for its suppliers.
constructed

the

barrier

in

response

to

Sandy Hills, however,
the

Steurs1

wrongful

construction of improvements in the 26-foot right-of-way. In addition,
whether Sandy Hills needs access for suppliers through the right-of-way
is immaterial.

The right-of-way is not an easement by implication or

way of necessity.

Sandy Hills owns the right to access through the

right-of-way for its suppliers and that right was impeded by Steurs1
actions.
The Steurs argue that it is not physically impossible for a 50-foot
tractor/trailer to turn right from 2100 East into the right-of-way.

15

Likewise, the parties' contemplation at the time of the Agreement of the size
of delivery vehicles does not control when the easement is of a definite width. Sandy
Hills' commercial lessees are not limited to trading with suppliers who use 1950s
vintage delivery vehicles.

That is absolutely true.

It is not physically impossible.

however, physically

more difficult.

much

The

access

It is,

with

the

improvements in the right-of-way has been reduced and is consequently
less inviting.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES DID
NOT CONTEMPLATE SEMI TRACTOR-TRAILERS USING THE
RIGHT-OF-WAY IN LIGHT OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
OF THE DEED AND AGREEMENT

C

The trial court found:
10.
The Agreement did not contemplate semitractor/trailers having access to the rear of the
Sandy Hills, Inc. buildings through the right-of-way
inasmuch as the parking arrangement precluded semitractor/trailers from having access to the rear of
the Sandy Hills, Inc. buildings.
Record at 692, 695 (Finding of Fact 10). This finding is erroneous
because the deed of right-of-way expressly allowed access by the
grantees1

(Deweys1

buildings.

and Smiths1) suppliers to the rear

Exhibit S-ll.

In addition, and as set

of their
forth in

defendants1 main brief, the trial courtfs finding that a 50-foot
tractor/trailer could not access the rear with the current parking
arrangement evinces a misunderstanding of Jack De Mass1 testimony. On
cross-examination he testified:
Q. Okay. And your testimony is that he could not make the righthand turn up here into the 50-foot right-of-way unless there were
no cars parked up there, right?
A.

With the sidewalk in place, that is correct.

Q. Okay. You're talking about the same sidewalk over here to the
left-hand side.
A.

Yes.

Record at 1522 (emphasis added).
The Steurs argue that De Mass did not say that the truck could make
the turn with the old sidewalk in place. The necessary implication of
Mr. De Mass1 testimony, however, is that with the use of the full width

of the easement—which was possible with the old sidewalk—the truck
driver could maneuver the right-hand turn from the 26-foot right-of-way
into the 50-foot right-of-way.
Nevertheless, the Steurs argue that the deed of right-of-way from
the Smiths and Deweys to Callister required a parking plan designating
parking areas and travel ways.

According to the Steurs, since the

parking plan defendants1 established would not allow a fifty-foot
tractor trailer to turn into the 50-foot right of way if all the
parking spaces were filled, the parties did not contemplate that fiftyfoot rigs would use the 26-foot right-of-way.
First,

Reed

established.

Smith

testified

Record at 267-68.

that

a

parking

plan

was

never

Second, defendants (the Smiths and

Sandy Hills) would not have established a parking plan on the Homer
property, which is where the difficulty lies.

Reed Smith testified

that the parties separately maintained the parking areas on the east
portions of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. Third, De Mass1 testimony was not that
the truck could not enter the 50-foot right-of-way with all the parking
places filled.

He said that the truck could not negotiate the turn

"unless there were no cars up there" (on the west side of the parking)
with the sidewalk in place. Record at 1522, 1524-25. Finally, Mr. De
Mass stated that if compact cars parked in all of the west side spaces
except the first two, the truck could negotiate the turn—with the
sidewalk in place. Record at 1524-25, 1522. It would not be difficult
for Homer to designate those west side parking stalls for compact cars
only so that the parking use of the 50-foot right-of-way did not
conflict with the ingress/egress use of the 26-foot right-of-way for

suppliers.16

Under
the

the

trial

arrangement

of

parking

contemplated

in 1953 and 1954.

courtfs

stalls

finding,

dictates

the

what

present-day
the

parties

In any event, what the parties

contemplated when they entered into the Agreement is that it would be
used by suppliers.

The deed of right-of-way is perpetual:

That the Grantor . . . does hereby grant to the Grantees, their
heirs and assigns forever, a right of way . . . .
. . .

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said right of way to the said
Grantees, their heirs and assignees, suppliers, customers and
repairmen, and for their use forever in common with the Grantor
•

• • •

Exhibit S-ll.

Thus, t h e p a r t i e s contemplated t h a t the right-of-way would be used
by s u p p l i e r s in t h e f u t u r e .
trucks.

Supplies are c u r r e n t l y d e l i v e r e d in l a r g e

As t h e court s t a t e d in Camp Meeker Water System v. Public

U t i l i t i e s Comm'n. 799 P.2d 758 (Cal. 1990),
designed t o accommodate future needs."

fl

[A]n express easement i s

Id. a t 771.

The t r i a l c o u r t ' s

finding i s c l e a r l y in e r r o r .
In conclusion, t h e improvements placed by t h e Steurs in r i g h t - o f way impermissibly reduced i t s width.
CONCLUSION

For t h e reasons s e t forth herein and in Appellants 1 main b r i e f ,
Appellants r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t :
1.

That t h i s Court reverse the t r i a l c o u r t ' s awarding t o Homer a

p r e s c r i p t i v e easement across t h e front and r e a r of t h e Sandy H i l l s
property and order t h e t r i a l court t o e n t e r a judgment

dismissing

Homer's claim for a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement with p r e j u d i c e ;

16

I t i s arguably impermissible under the terms of the 1953 Agreement and the
deeds of r i g h t - o f - w a y for the parking arrangement on t h e 5 0 - f o o t r i g h t - o f - w a y t o
c o n f l i c t with t h e use of t h e 26-foot right-of-way•

of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, and direct the court to
enter an order requiring Homer to remove the encroachment; and
3.

Reverse the trial court's determination that the Steurs were

entitled to construct the "improvements" in the 26-foot right-of-way,
and direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of defendants and
against the Steurs on the Steurs1 claim.
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following

Answers

to

Plaintiff

Frederick

R.

Homer's

First

Set

of

Interrogatories as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. L :

Identify the person answering these

Interrogatories and describe that persons' legal relationship to
the Defendant Sandy Hills, Inc.
ANSWER:

Reed M. Smith, 1305 Yuma Street, Salt Lake City,

Utah; Secretary.

in

INTERROGATORY NO. 2.:

Identify each person who participated

the

any

preparation

of

answer

or

response

to

these

Interrogatories, and specify which answer or response each person
helped prepare.
ANSWER:

Reed M. Smith; all Interrogatories.

Cynthia K.

Cassell, Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street, #400,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; all Interrogatories.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3.:

Identify each person the Defendant

Sandy Hills, Inc. expects to call as a witness at the trial of
this matter, and state:
(a)

the subject matter on which he or she is expected

to testify; and
(b)

the substance of the facts and opinions about which

he or she is expected to testify.
ANSWER:

Reed M. Smith will testify about the history of the

ownership and development of the area on 21st East which is the
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proper

- n*:-

>WT * - whc se

ituate

the bandy H n .*.
"Subject

Arer

erein
MT . Smith

r<-?t

concerning

his

property in the Subject Area, arid trie leasing and sale of Dewey's
property

others

iI h will

testify concerning Vera

^toperty i n l.li11 Hub ji
the --.--

* :allisterfs property 1 u others.

Mr. Smith will testify »':
1.

Thai

hi:111,, I

r.-hon-He? ^ n d p u rposes, was the

• original commercial deve] j>-__ __ property in the Subject
Area ;
2.

That he and Barbara Smith f i r s t p u r c h a s e d p r o p e r t y

i n t h e S u b j e c t Area in or about 1947, and s h o r t l y
1""".:| '-i riii 1, i n I ' l i i i ' i ,! ' j i o c o r y
3.

s i rin t'111 l i n t l.liii„y

pioperty;

That Thomas Dewey d e s i r e d t o p u r c h a s e d pax*

p r o p e r t y purchased by MT .inrl Mr»
i

n, I Ii ,j,l

thereafter

Smith

-

uiiau Mx. u<-^

i\h In mi i > h u i l d i n g on t h e p r o p e r t y ;

S m i t h ' s e v e n t u a l l y s o l d t o him, p r i o r t o t h e time t h e Smiths
a c t u a l l y s o l d t h e p r o p e r t y in liiiii ,

4.

That the Dewey drugstore and the Smith grocery

store had been operating for several years before the west
side of 21st East Street was improved with curb, gutter and
sidewalk, and that prior to the

installation

of these

improvements, patrons of the businesses drove their cars
directly off the street onto the parking areas of the stores,
unrestricted by curbs or other barriers separating the street
and the parking areas;
5.

That

in

connection

with

21st

East

Street's

improvement with curb, gutter and sidewalk, Mr. Smith and Mr.
Dewey vehemently objected to Salt Lake City's decisions
respecting placement of curb cuts along 21st East Street, to
no avail;
6.

That after 21st East Street was improved with curb,

gutter and sidewalk, Mr. Smith permitted Mr. Dewey and his
patrons to traverse Mr. Smith's property located adjacent to
the Dewey property;
7.

That in 1963, or thereabouts, Mr. Dewey began

leasing the drugstore building to Plaintiff Homer, and that
in or about 1976, Plaintiff Homer purchased the drugstore
building

including

the

barbershop,

pizza

parlor

apartments, from Lorraine Dewey, Mr. Dewey's widow;

4

and

8.

Thai neither M.i
(||d\M

lessees

nil

l

( I P ! lii i SS l ( H I

uLtieis

Smith, nor his s u c c e s s o r ^

I II

n. HI d uu i ni| I y,

through

on

t r a v e r s e t h e p r o p e r l y owned by Mr, Smith or h i s
mi I I

III III

II i

mi in I

9•

mi ni ni ni III 111

That

mi I i i mi

Plaintif f

I

I I n M H 1111 v

Homn i

under

him,

successor^)

111 mi III II " i I HI i I i I i n y i ;

I

I essees,

agents,

customer--

invitees and others have wrongfully trespassed on

Sanay

' property by traversing and par k ingi" on the sam^aintilf

wrr

s prill

Homer's

o n I 11

apartmer

I In • in u m I

lessees

havt

I

damage to the root.
e Sandy Hills roof leaks continually during
in " j i p i t e

a

*^r*

Lots

I IN11" i"

Ill

he apartments over the Homer building.
1 Ii rJiiil, III1 JII d J j i t 11 ll, Ik, in(,•„""in bought the rear p o r t i o n s ot

3 and

4 ot

I Ii

Litchfield

Gardens

from

Evans and

Jorgason several ],,rears subsequi
t

" Jl".
I

" •

Dewey;
-

. °* *>

-

ol-way and parkii ig a r e a s ;
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iiillii "'

^r. information and belief, in the encroachment ol

the nortii
12.

i * j p ( ' « ! I ("ii i e p d i mi i I

b

)ewey,

14.

That Mr. Smith, Mr. Dewey and Mrs. Callister

entered into an agreement in November, 1953, whereby in
exchange for Mrs. Callister's granting to Mr. Dewey and to
Mr. Smith the right to use her alleyway running east and west
from 21st East to the rear of Mr. Smith's and Mr. Dewey's
properties, Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey granted Mrs. Callister
the right to use 9 parking spaces on each of Mr. Smith's and
Mr. Dewey's rear parking areas and the right to cross Mr.
Smith's rear parking area from 1300 South to Mr. Dewey's rear
parking area and to cross Mr. Dewey's rear parking area to
her alleyway.
15.

That after purchasing Mrs. Callister's property,

the Steur Plaintiffs, in breach of the November, 1953,
agreement
narrowed

and
the

the

subsequently

alleyway

from

recorded

approximately

rights-of-way,
26

feet

to

approximately 21 feet, despite Smith's and Sandy Hills' oral
and written objections thereto;
16.
November,

That the Steur Plaintiffs, in violation of the
1953, agreement and the subsequently recorded

rights-of-way, have used many more than 18 total parking
spaces in the rear parking areas owned by Plaintiff Homer and
Defendant Sandy Hills; and that the Steur Plaintiffs have
further authorized and directed their patrons to park on the

2100^.DS2
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front p a r k i n g area of the? Sandy H i l l s * p a r c e l d e s p i t e demand
in mi i i ni ni > 11 11 mi ni in 1 1 ni ni 111

I J1 ,

That

. . ) mi i ni 11 i

t hi-;

Steurs

have

Incited

othe • • ,

including

S t e u r ' s patrons iiinml n e i g h b o r i n g businofin iiwncri
a g a i n s t RHCIII iind Barbara SmiLli p e r s o n a l l y

tor Sandy H i l l s '

e f f o r t s to p o l i c e i t s p a r k i n g art
Mi
Hills

has

Suit i I III i

su£ f ered

-

«

;) i

n i ni in I

i I ni mil in ||i

P1 a i n1 i 1 f s

i

IIIII

I I

iftrrongf u I

actions.
egoxin,
but

exhaustive,

summary

expected testimony.

>•

ubstance

Smith's

Further, Mr". Smith has been depose Il IIIII in ill: Ji =

case, which testimony MI whole or in part will be used at trial.
Barbara Smith, 1305 Yuma, Sri It Lake City, Utah, may be called
a s a wi
case,

ni ni

" list"",

the subject matter

II I s h i p

i ,«•

" a I I v .1 i i f i * i L n e . s is IIIII I I 111 1 1

and substance of h e r testimony L*->

e x p e c t e d to b e substantially identical to Mr S m i t h ' s testimony.
Defendants »"eFen ^ I In i i< "
identi i i.e:i

m <•

in ivill i M 11 i.i I I .i I w i t n e s s e s whoiit?

J ncapable

ascert'a m m e n i

jl

this

time,

D e f e n d a n t s also reserve t..w -^.v,**w ^o s u p p l e m e n t Lhexr answer Lo

2100^4.DS2
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INTERROGATORY NO. 4.;

Identify each person the Defendant

Sandy Hills expects to call as an expert witness at the trial of
this matter and state:
(a)

the subject matter on which he or she is expected

to testify; and
(b) That the substance of the facts and opinions about
which he is she is expected to testify.
ANSWER:

Jack L. DeMass (hereinafter "Mr. DeMassM), Civil

Engineer and Registered Land Surveyor, 118 Vine Street, Murray,
Utah, will

testify

concerning

his

survey

of

property

and

buildings contained in the Subject Area. Mr DeMass will testify
that the north wall of the apartment building located above the
Homer building encroaches over onto the Sandy Hills building, and
that the construction of a sidewalk in the alleyway running east
and west from 21st East Street reduced the width of the alleyway
from approximately 26 feet to approximately 21 feet.
David T. Beaufort of Wayne T. VanWagoner & Assoc, will
testify concerning his survey of the alleyway and will testify
that as a result of the construction of a sidewalk in the
alleyway, a typical 18-wheel tractor-trailer rig is not able to
get to the rear of the Sandy Hills building via the alleyway.
Jack Shockey, Shockey Roofing, will testify concerning his
re-roofing the Sandy Hills building, and that in his opinion, the

2100}$.DS2

8

n o r t h w a l l of t h e a p a r t m e n t s a b o v e t h e Homer b u i l d i n g h a s c a u s e d
|

11 I

1111
,

II II

ll"1

|ll I II II

'I•

II

.•Ill '"'{I"-'

"Will

111 '

II I"! I I I

III III

I"

the Sandy Miljb baildxiiy despite re-roofing and maintenance on
the Sandy HI Lis
JIMI i

roof,

i III III

III i l l l l l l l

II I l| I I I

i i [ l | III d 1 h P I

property values due tu problems with

IM i ' 1 111

llHjlll

"If I

I i "fir'i!

I

the property and limitation

o.ii ingress and egress.
INTERROGATORY NO, 5.;

Identify al 1 documents which the

Defendant Sandy Hills, Inc. intends to introduce as exhibits at

ANSWER:
Procedure

Pursuant to Rule 33(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
)efendant

Sandy

Hills

i ntern icia
inspectioi

sponse
n

Production
'• '.'ii'etj'J1!, it,'

ocumen+-

errogai

DATED t h i s

e ntnt's
'hi ^h

Third

Request

*iC xxou r e c j u e s t e d

compiled.

d a y >n A p r i l ,

jq<»n

CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

CYNTllIA K. CASSELL

2100^.DS2
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in

i
tue

SANDY J i l L L S , INC.

Qyi

/

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On this

y

REED'M. SftlTH

I t s : Secretary

)
: ss.
)

day of April, 1990, personally appeared before

Reed M. Smith, who being by me first duly sworn, did say that he
is the Secretary of Sandy Hills, Inc., a Utah corporation, and
that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof and
the same are true to the best of his knowledge, except as to
those matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and
belief, and to those matters he believes them to be true; that
the foregoing was signed on behalf of said corporation and
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same.

/ f & Y p ^vN.
f&S*~^<l;~
\

NOTARY PUBLIC\ y J ^r "
Residing ±X.x ^ U £ U * 9

My Commission Expires:

*:•>
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

111,'HI IIV

DEFENDANT'S

I ' K R T I I'V

ANSWERS

II III Il

Il I n »

TO PLAINTIFF

c

'

illlili",

Il

HOMER'S

(ill i I ,

FIRST

II "r "I I"!'

SET OF

INTERROGATORIES was served on Plaintiff hy having hand-delivered
ill, I nit"" and correct v

here* 11 h I.hi.'

Harold C. Verhaaren, Esq
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Michae 1 1 J. Homer, Esq.
Paul M. Simmons, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Clark Learning Office Center, 7th Floor
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake C i t y ,

Utah 84 II CI 111 Ill 1 8 0

4J^CC6^^C
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